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"So What?": HR Measurement as a Change Catalyst
There is unprecedented recognition among top managers throughout the world that
people make the difference. Reading the professional business press, one would think that the
battle for measuring the impact of human resources has already been won. Emerging "flexible
organizations" are seen as requiring increased attention to vision, style, cooperation and
teamwork (Ghoshal & Mintzberg, 1994; Halal, 1993). Business writers tout the essential role of
"world-class training" that values "people skills" and fosters "ent epreneurship" (Dumaine, 1995;
Rau, 1994). We even see the latest pair of best-selling authors, Michael Hammer and James
Champy chiding managers that "the biggest lie told by most organizations is that 'people are our
most important assets"', and calling for dramatically "increased investments in people"
(Lancaster, 1995). It is also apparent that some of the most admired managers say managing
people as their most important role. Jack Welch, of General Electric Corporation is quoted as
saying "Anybody who gets this [CEO] job has got to believe in the gut that people are the key to
everything" (Tichy, 1993). There is also growing evidence that organizational success is
correlated with the existence of combinations of "high-performance" work designs and "high-
performance" human resource practices (MacDuffie, 1995; Arthur, 1994; Huselid, in press).
Yet, managers must consider investments in human resource programs, and such
evidence is not much help. The quotes from the CEO provide little guidance in determining
whether it makes sense to invest in more expensive selection, training or compensation
programs. Evidence at the firm level that the existence of certain human resource practices in
combination with certain work designs does not always provide the basis for deciding if a given
organization should invest in those practices. In a sense, such evidence works from the "top"
downward, by suggesting how broad human resource patterns do affect broad organizational
outcomes. In contrast, most HR investment decisions are "bottom-up". That is, they require a
decision maker to choose between alternative practices applied to a particular group of
employees. The observable results of such programs will occur largely at the employee level,
not at the organizational level.
Thus, there remains a need for frameworks and models that can help managers to
enhance their ability to identify, communicate and make decisions about the impact of human
resources on groups of employees, and to show how those decisions into broader
organizational outcomes. Presumably, HR measurement should contribute to the development
of those frameworks.
The need to assess the impact of humans on the work place is perennial. Time and
motion studies, behavioral accounting, human resource accounting, human resource costing,
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ratio analysis, human resource audits, utility analysis and even recent developments such as
core competency analysis are all ways to address the fundamental question -- "How can we
measure the contribution of people to important organizational goals?" Typically, HR
measurement research and practice has focused on developing internally logical measures,
simulating measurement procedures that resemble acceptable corporate approaches (such as
audits, dollarvalued investment returns, balanced scorecards, or employee value- dded). Two
underlying premises often underlie these measurement attempts: (1) Measures will lead
decision makers to make more rational and productive choices about how people are managed;
or (2) Measures will help convince others to support and invest in human resource management
programs (Boudreau, 1991). Yet, these premises have gone largely uninvestigated.
Though shamelessly anecdotal, one recurring episode from my experience seems to
sum up the dilemma. In my work with organizations, I am sometimes asked to participate in
efforts to "develop a way to measure human resources." Initially, the managers usually suggest
that they are looking for a measurement system, because they just don't seem to have any
good HR measures. However, as we talk, it usually becomes apparent that they are using many
HR measures already (e.g., salary costs, separation rates, time to fill vacancies, absenteeism,
attitudes, etc.). In fact, many organizations admit that they recently adopted sweeping changes
in their measurement systems to address a perceived lack of information. At this point, the
question becomes, "If you have all of these measures, why do you think you need more?". The
answer is something like, "We're just not getting the support we want from line managers, who
think HR is too 'soft," or, "We just don't seem to be creating world-class HR systems." Thus, the
fundamental question about HR measurement is not "How do we construct the best HR
measure?" but "How do we induce changes through HR measurement systems?" Answering
that question implies a very different approach to HR measurement research and practice.
The scientific discussion of HR measurement frequently focuses on the logical
consistency of assumptions, and the possibility that one estimation approach might produce
different results from another (e.g., much of the utility analysis research of the 1980's and
1990's, Boudreau, 1991). Much of the practical discussion has focused on describing new
measurement systems, instructing managers how to locate and organize the measures, and
demonstrating how the numbers produced resemble well-accepted corporate measures (such
as financial accounting measures or ratios). While this literature often suggests the value of
such measurement systems for enhancing credibility with "line" managers (e.g., Cascio, 1991;
Fitz-Enz, 1984; Flamholtz, 1985), little research has actually tested this suggestion (Latham &
Whyte, 1994 provide one laboratory experiment that did address it). In this paper, I will suggest
Measurement as a Change Catalyst WP 95-34
Page 5
that we can learn much about how to develop and improve measurement systems by focusing
away from the measures, and toward those who are or should be affected by them. Even good
communication can have detrimental effects, such as blocked learning (Argyris, 1994).
This requires that we focus on how key constituents conceive of human resource
management, how they determine whether human resource activities are worthwhile, and how
we can better help them use the available information to improve their decisions. This position is
not new. For example, it was a central premise behind the original development of selection
utility models (Cronbach & Gleser, 1965). Moreover, well-dev oped theories are available that
speak to the general question of information effectiveness. However, in our rush to develop ever
more elaborate and new measurement systems, HR researchers and managers have ignored
the possibility of research into measurement effects. At the same time, theories of effects of
information have not focused on areas other than HR measurement. This creates a significant
opportunity for integration. In this paper, I will describe some selected theories of information
effects, and give examples of their implications for future research and application of HR
measurement systems. The examples are not meant to be comprehensive, but rather
illustrative.
Information Receivers and Information Goals
Information affects people by persuading, affecting decisions, changing attitudes, etc.
But, who are the relevant subjects of those effects? Most discussion of HR measurement
focuses on HR managers or line managers as subjects, and improved decision quality as the
goal. While undoubtedly important, this rational influence model can be extended. Everyone
who might receive or transmit HR measurements is a potential subject for analysis. Some
receivers are "targets", usually line managers or HR managers. However, this group might also
include government officials, financial analysts, and even suppliers or customers. The goals for
these receivers are often to directly improve decisions or to persuade them to a certain opinion.
Other receivers are "observers," who do not represent primary targets for persuasion or
decision support. Nonetheless such groups will observe the HR measurements and for
judgments about their significance. Often, the symbolic value of the measurements will be
important here, as they signal what the organization values. Persuasion and decision influence
are also important here, but the effects are often indirect and frequently not considered by
creators of measurement systems. Finally, we could focus on the "senders" of HR measurement
information. The HR managers and others who use measurement systems make choices about
their tactics that may help us better understand the adoption and effectiveness of those
systems.
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Thus, we adopt a "choice" model of HR measurement, in which such systems are
adopted based on communication goals and probable receiver responses (Shelby, 1988, 1991).
Such choices may be informed or uninformed, political or altruistic. The premise is that better
understanding why such choices are made, and better understanding the receiver responses to
HR measurement systems will lead to more effective choices. Such an approach clearly
acknowledges the possibility for unethical or political motivation in such choices, which may
create some uneasiness. "Such discomfort is preferable to ignorance, however" (Pfeffer, 1981).
HR Measurement as Decision Support
Perhaps the simplest reason to measure HR management is to improve decisions. This
is certainly one of the most widely-proposed reasons for the existence and continued
development of measurement models and methods (Boudreau, 1991; Cascio, 1991; Flamholtz,
1984). While much has been made of the ability of improved HR measures to improve
decisions, the evidence for such improvements is very sparse. In fact, the one recent study to
explicitly examine the effects of utility analysis on decisions found that the more elaborate utility
analysis actually had a negative effect on manager's willingness to adopt a particular selection
program (Latham & Whyte, 1994). Given the fundamental importance of the premise that
improved HR measures improve decisions, one would expect to see far more research devoted
to this issue. From a normative perspective, HR measures create value to the extent that they
(1) Improve a large number of decisions; and/or (2) Improve important decisions (Boudreau,
1991). To date, no study has examined the effects of different HR measures on the decision
processes of managers facing actual organizational choices. Though proposals for HR
measurement abound, they are not generally supported by evidence that improved
measurement actually improves decisions. Future research could address this issue by
examining which organizational decision makers actually receive and use HR information, the
effect of that information on their decisions, and the effects of those decisions on organizational
outcomes. Anecdotal evidence (e.g., Florin-Thuma & Boudreau, 1987) suggests that HR
measurement can induce managers to think differently about the way HR practices affect
organizational outcomes, but much better developed theory is needed to guide research and
development of systems that will indeed improve decisions.
Decision Theory and Biases
Decades of research have demonstrated that human decision makers fall prey to
predictable decision biases (Bazerman, 1990). For example, evidence suggests that when
gambles are framed as choices between certain moderate losses versus the possibility of either
large loss or no loss, most people tend to choose the risky choice. Exactly the opposite effect
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occurs when the choice is "framed" as gains, even when the economic outcomes are the same
across all four situations. People also tend to overestimate the probability of events that are very
vividly depicted or recalled, compared to events that are less vivid. The list of such biases is
extensive, and suggests that decisions may depart from an economically "rational" model even
when decision makers have no ulterior motives.
These affects may well influence reactions to HR measurement systems, but we have
very little evidence about such effects. Moreover, the possibility of such effects is seldom
incorporated into the design of HR measurement systems. For example, if HR measurements
emphasize costs and cost reduction, costs become very vivid. Past HR practices that resulted in
reduced costs are remembered clearly, while practices that produced enhanced work force
value may not be so well recalled. Over time, this may create a bias in favor of programs that
can generate cost reductions, while worthy programs that produce "less measurable" value are
ignored or rejected. Theories of decision behavior can provide frameworks to guide research
and practice to develop measurement systems that better guard against such decision biases.
HR Measurement as Persuasion
Perhaps the most pervasive body of theory and evidence about measurement and its
effects emanates from the field of communication, especially persuasion. Though seldom
applied to questions of HR measurement, this literature very explicitly addresses information
(including measurement) as a decision focused on influencing receivers, usually to the benefit of
the sender (Quinn, Hildebrandt, Rogers & Thompson, 1991; Reardon, 1991; Perloff, 1993).
Transmission Characteristics
Some persuasion theories focus on attributes of the information source, message, and
channel. Sources exhibiting expertise may be more persuasive, especially for receivers with low
involvement in the issue. Trustworthiness may be enhanced by adopting a position at odds with
the source's know biases (e.g., Ronald Reagan expressing support for Gorbachev's reform
efforts).
Message-related factors include evidence (facts originating from outside sources),
which has been shown to be one of the most persuasive factors, with highly-involved receivers
being affected by the quality of the evidence, and low-involved receivers responding to the
apparent amount of evidence. Factors such as vividness, the use of fear appeals, the use of
two-sided messages that acknowledge opposing arguments, and whether one points out the
conclusions to be drawn have all been examined.
Channel-related factors include whether m ssages are presented visually or in writing.
Such effects seem to interact with the complexity or difficulty of the message.
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Receiver Characteristics
Source, Message and Channel factors reflect the message- ending process. Several
theories focus on the activity of message receivers. Perhaps the most widely-cited of these is
the "elaboration likelihood model" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). This model suggests that
individuals may process messages "centrally", which involves a good deal of thought, internal
cognition and "elaboration," or they can process messages "peripherally," which involves limited
cognitive involvement, and relies on broad cues and images. Whether a receiver uses one route
or the other depends on the personal relevance of the issue, their cognitive ability and need,
personal knowledge, distractions, message comprehensibility etc. If a receiver uses the
"central" processing route, they are more likely to be persuaded by the quality of evidence, less
persuaded by peripheral cues (number of arguments, attractiveness of the source, etc.), and
more likely to form enduring attitudes.
Organization Characteristics
Dutton & Ashford (1993) draw on the persuasion literature to suggest factors related to
middle-manager's success in "selling issues" to top management. The goal of such selling is to
gain top management attention to the seller's issue, and to see subsequent action. Their model
emphasizes the importance of the organizational context and consequences of measurement.
Moreover, it may be particularly important to HR measurement because HR managers are
frequently "middle managers" attempting to influence higher-level managers through their HR
measures. This framework is particularly valuable in recognizing the effects of the "issue selling"
process on peripheral observers. It also provides a framework for analyzing how issues are
"framed," to create impressions of partnership, obligation or blame. Pfeffer (1981) has proposed
that the selling processes of middle managers are one factor in the way that organizations
create "meaning." The issues that top managers choose to attend to create symbolic signals to
employees, shareholders, and financial analysts. There is some evidence that HR "reputation"
may correlate with changes in share price (Hannon & Milkovich, 1995), though the results were
mixed.
Self-Interested Senders
It has been noted that a utilitarian perspective on communication must recognize that
senders act in their own self interests (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Pfeffer, 1981). A vivid examples
is provided by Argyris (1994), who describes several examples of "good communication" that
blocks learning. He proposes that most communication systems foster direct single-loop
responses with specific actions addressing specific problems. However, they tend to stifle
"double-loop" learning which requires asking questions about the fundamental premises of the
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organization. For example, total quality management efforts may produce suggestions to
drastically reduce costs. However, traditional communication about total quality may fail to ask
why the cost-reduction opportunities went unrecognized for so long. Managers are often
reluctant to engage in double-loop communication because it risks questioning familiar and
often personally valuable traditions.
 Implications for HR Measurement
Persuasion-based theory presents a rich opportunity for research and practice in HR
measurement. Every HR measurement carries persuasive components, whether managers are
aware of it or not. For example, highly complex "business case" analyses may presume that
those receiving the information are "centrally" involved, and prepared to devote cognitive effort
to the message. If, in fact, the audience is only peripherally involved, the appropriate
measurement system might better rely on peripheral cues such as the amount and
attractiveness of the information, or personal appeals from recognized experts. This theory also
draws attention to the importance of considering the impact of HR measures as signals of
organizational values and priorities. For example, attitude surveys may serve to signal that the
organization values the welfare of its employees, regardless of the value of the information for
improving decisions. Presently, we have virtually no information about whether the persuasive
characteristics of HR measurement systems affect those who receive the information. We do
know that HR measurement systems span the range from highly elaborate and quantitative to
simple and qualitative. It would be interesting to determine if the pattern of these differences
appears to reflect the influence of factors from persuasion theory, and whether the
correspondence of HR measures with persuasion principles is correlated with their persuasive
effects.
There is also opportunity for enhanced research and practice by examining the
motivations of those designing HR measurement systems, within the framework of "issue
selling" and persuasion. We have all encountered managers who resist our suggestions to
measure certain outcomes because the results might prove troublesome or disturbing. It would
be interesting to explore whether such considerations affect the design of HR measurement
systems as well.
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HR Measurement As "Fashion Setting" for Innovation
Johns (1993) notes that human resource practices widely viewed as effective by
psychological researchers (e.g., performance-bas d pay, structured selection systems,
productivity-based recruitment) are adopted only slowly by organizations, despite research
evidence supporting them. He proposes several reasons for slow adoption, including: (1) HR
practices portrayed as "technical," using quantitative and rational measurements, when in fact
HR practices are "administrative", affecting the social system of the organization, and subject to
more political or social interests; (2) HR theory and research often ignores the social context,
which makes evidence difficult to apply or generalize; (3) HR practice effects often involve very
complicated causal chains, creating uncertainty about their effects; (4) Innovations are often
motivated by external threat or exogenous shock; (5) Administrative innovations tend to be
adopted first by large organizations and then imitated by others. He suggests that adoption of
research-based HR practices would be enhanced if researchrs focused on creating external
pressures in government, more frequently provided the names of research sites and the context
of the research, do research in purer contexts of greenfield sites, and create social networks to
enhance visibility.
Abrahamson (1991, 1994) suggests that while many lament the tendency for HR
innovators to follow fashions and fads, the proper response by HR professionals and scholars
should be to study this fashion-setting process. He suggests that innovations often exhibit
popularity behavior similar to fashions such as hemlines not for trivial reasons, but for
predictable and logical reasons. "Norms of progress," require that managers appear to solve old
problems and create new and innovative ways to address new problems, creating a need to
identify what techniques are considered progressive at any time. Abrahamson suggests that this
identification process is influenced by a management "fashion-setting industry" including
management consultants, business schools and the business press. These fashion-setters
invent or discover management techniques and then imitate and diffuse them by discourse
about performance gaps and solutions. Some theories of management fashion adoption
suggest that fashion followers react to frustration, a need for novelty, or a need for status.
Others suggest that consumers of fashion are motivated by more social-t chnical processes
such as economic fluctuations, tensions inherent in organizational structures, and bounded
rationality.
HR measurement systems are both influence and are influenced by the dissemination of
innovations, and their resemblance to fashion. If HR practices are administrative, then
measurement systems that better explicate causal chains, account for context, track external
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shocks and pressures, and reflect the practices of large organizations are likely to be most
effective in promoting innovation. Such systems might be to include measures of the
"innovativeness" of HR practices. Organizations "innovation" as one dimension of its HR
measurement system, and tracked the number of times its practices were featured in the
business press, the number of inquiries received from other companies, and the number of
awards received. To better explicate causal chains, organizations might measure HR practices
at several levels. Many organizations consider the "four levels" of evaluation in their
measurement (reactions, learning, behaviors, and results , Kirkpatrick, 1994), at least in the
design phase. Theories of innovation suggest that a key component of measurement must be to
show the links between these levels, to better explain the causal chains between HR effects.
Research is needed because we have virtually no scientific evidence to suggest whether
a theory of innovation and fashion-setting describes how HR measures are used and
developed. Do key decision makers look for evidence of innovativeness in HR practices, as a
key dimensioni  their adoption? Are they concerned with uncertainty and the complexity of
causal chains? Do they focus more on the social and political ramifications of HR practices than
their "technical" effects on core organizational goals? Answers to these questions may provide
important insights into the nature of HR measurement and its effects.
Conclusion
The examples here show that there is much to be learned about the effects of HR
measurements on their receivers. Fortunately, there is also much available theory, and some
empirical research, to support these investigations. Changing the focus of HR measurement
from the measures to their effects uncovers important gaps in our knowledge, and important
opportunities for further research and measurement system development. One fundamental fact
of future organizations will be an abundance, even a tidal wave, of information. HR
measurements will increasingly have to compete with ever greater amounts and types of
information. While past work has helped to expand HR measurement techniques, both
managers and scholars would be well served by systematic research on how to make those
techniques more effective.
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